This paper demonstrates how to use a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver together with a bounded model checker to prove temporal refinement conditions. The method is demonstrated by refining a specification of the 8N] protocol, a widely-used protocol for serial data transmission. A nondeterministic finite-state 8N] specification is refined to an infinite-state implementation in which interleavings are constrained by real-time linear inequalities. The refinement proof is via automated induction proofs over infinite-state transitions systems using SMT and model checking, as implemented in SRI International's Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL).
Introduction
A recently-developed formal verification technique combines a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver and a bounded model checker to prove LTL safety properties over infinite-state transition systems. The proof technique implemented is k-induction, a generalization of induction over (infinite-state) transition systems; for brevity, we will call the verification technique infinite-bmc induction (for infinite-state bounded model checking induction) [4, 13] . One implementation of infinite-bmc induction is in SRI International's Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [3] . In this paper, we apply infinite-bmc induction to easily prove the correctness of a class of real-time protocols.
Traditionally in model checking, a finite-state abstraction of a real-time protocol is used to model the passage of time with an asynchronous interleaving semantics. The benefit of such an abstraction is that if the finite-state model is not too large, it can be verified automatically using standard model checking techniques (e.g., BDDs). Furthermore, a finite-state model of the protocol can be composed with a finite-state model of synchronous hardware, and the composition may also be model-checked. However, to ensure the that safety properties proved of the finite-state model Lee Pike Galois, Inc. leepike@galois .com hold of the infinite-state one, in which the progress of time is modeled with better fidelity, one must complete a refinement proof from the former to the latter.
In this paper, we describe a simple refinement approach, derived from the classic Abadi-Lamport refinement method [1] . We emphasize that the approach described is one to refine temporal constraints and does not address other refinements such as data refinement. We demonstrate how a specification can be formally refined into a more deterministic implementation. The refinement ensures that the safety properties that hold of the finite-state model also hold of the infinite-state model. As a case-study, we demonstrate the approach by refining a finite-state model of the 8N1 protocol, a common physical-layer protocol used for serial data transmission between independently-clocked hardware (described in detail in Section 2.2), into an implementation that explicitly captures real-time constraints by linear inequalities over the real numbers. To prove the correctness of the protocol, we use BDDs. To prove the refinement holds, we use infinite-bmc induction. Besides a method of temporal refinement, this paper introduces a succinct and general constraint-based model of physical-layer protocols that simplifies the proofs and decomposes the model of the environment (i.e., the effects of metastability) and the protocol specification. Specifications and proofs are also available for refinements of the Biphase Mark protocol and a version of the 8N1 protocol that includes shift-registers.'
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe related work, the 8N1 protocol, and the SAL model checker. The finite-state specification of the 8N1 protocol and its proof of correctness is presented in Section 3. The infinite-state implementation of 8Nl is presented in Section 4. We verify the refinement of the specification to the implementation in Section 5. We conclude with a brief discussion in Section 6.
'The specifications and proofs in SAL associated with this paper are available at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/lepike/pubpages/refinement.html. SAL can be obtained at http://fm. csl.sri.com/.
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Related Work and Background
In Section 2.1 we highlight previous work in physicallayer protocol verification. In Section 2.2, we describe the 8N1 protocol, and in Section 2.3, we describe the SAL model checker.
Physical-Layer Protocol Verification
The first infinite-bmc induction verification of a realtime protocol was Dutertre and Sorea's verification of the startup protocol for the Time-Triggered Architecture, a fault-tolerant bus [6] . Subsequently, the reintegration protocol for NASA Langley's SPIDER (another fault-tolerant bus) was verified [11] . Recently, the authors verified two prominent physical-layer communication protocols: the Biphase Mark protocol (BMP), which is used in CD-player decoders, Ethernet, and Tokenring, and the 8N1 protocol, which is used in universal asynchronous receivertransmitters (UARTs) [2] . The verification of the 8N1 protocol uncovered a significant error in the temporal constraints in an industrial technical note.
To motivate why infinite-bmc induction is of interest in real-time verification, consider that our verification of BMP in [2] resulted in an orders-of-magnitude reduction in effort as compared to the protocol's previous formal verifications using mechanical theorem proving. Our verification required 5 invariants, whereas a published proof using the mechanical theorem prover PVS required 37 [14] . Using infinite-bmc induction, proofs of the 5 invariants were completely automated, whereas the PVS proof initially required some 4000 user-supplied proof directives in total. Another proof using PVS is so large that the tool required 5 hours just to check the manually-generated proof whereas the SAL proof is generated automatically in seconds [9] . BMP has also been verified by J. Moore using Nqthm, a precursor to ACL2, requiring him to develop a model of asynchronous communication in the language of Applicative Common Lisp (Moore cites this as being one of the "best ideas" of his career, and at the time, it was a significant advancement in the formal analysis of physical-layer protocols) [10] .2
Partially-parameterized verifications of BMP have also been done using the Uppaal and Hytech real-time model checkers [7, 8] . SAL is not specifically a real-time model checker; time is modeled using the real numbers, and realtime constraints are captured as formulas (usually linear inequalities) over the reals. Real-time model checkers are automated; in infinite-bmc induction provers, whereas each proof attempt is automated, the user iteratively builds up invariants (by refinement from automatically-generated coun2See best-ideas/.
http: //www.cs.utexas.edu/users/moore/ terexamples on failed proof attempts) to ensure a proof attempt succeeds. With respect to expressiveness, the theory that real-time model checkers decide is weaker than the theory decided by contemporary SMT solvers. For example, SRI's Yices is a SMT solver for the satisfiability of (possibly quantified) formulas containing uninterpreted functions, real and integer linear arithmetic, arrays, fixed-size bit-vectors, recursive datatypes, tuples, records, and lambda expressions [5] .
Finally, we take a moment to delineate the contribution of this paper beyond the authors' previous work in physicallayer protocol verification [2] . There, verifications of realtime implementations of the 8N1 protocol and BMP were completed. In this paper, we demonstrate that the same proof technique can be used to complete a refinement proof, and that refinement allows for finite-state model composition. In both papers, we prove the same safety property holds, albeit in this paper, the property is over a finite-state model, so its formulation is simpler than its real-time equivalent from the authors' previous work. Additionally, we present improvements to the protocol model including (1) a more efficient model of metastability: rather than having additional state variables representing metastable states, the transition relation is made less deterministic, and (2) the effects of the environment on the protocol's behavior are decomposed into a separate environmental constraint module. The 8N1 protocol is a physical-layer protocol commonly used in UARTs for serial communication between two independently-clocked and unsynchronized hardware units. Figure 1 illustrates the 8N1 encoding scheme implemented by the sender's UART. A frame is a sequence of bits that includes a start bit, eight data bits, and a stop bit. Data bits are encoded by the identity function -a 1 is a 1 and a 0 is a 0. The receiver must estimate the transmitter's clock based upon the transitions in the data stream which are guaranteed to occur only once per frame. The central design issue for a data decoder is reliably extracting a clock signal from the data stream. Once the location of the clock events is known, extracting the data is relatively simple. Although the clock events have a known relationship to signal transitions, detecting these transitions precisely is usually impossible because of distortion in the signal around the transitions due to the transmission medium, clock jitter, and other effects. A fundamental assumption is that the transmitter and receiver of the data do not share a common time base and hence the estimation of clock events is affected by differences in the reference clocks used. Constant delay is largely irrelevant; however, transition time and variable delay (e.g., jitter) are not. Furthermore, differences in receiver and transmitter clock phase and frequency are significant. A correctness proof of an 8N1 decoder must be valid over a range of parameters defining limits on jitter, transition time, frequency, and clock phase.
The Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
(SAL) SAL has a high-level modeling language for specifying transition systems. A transition system is specified by a module. A module consists of a set of state variables (declared to be input, output, or local) and guarded transitions. A transition is enabled if its guard is true. Of the enabled transitions in a state, one is nondeterministically executed. When a transition is exercised, the next-state values are assigned to variables; for example, in the guarded transition, G --> a' = a -1; b' = a, if the guard G holds and the transition is exercised, then in the next state, the variable a is decremented by 1 and the variable b is updated to the previous value of a. In the language of SAL, ";" denotes statement separation, not sequential composition (thus, variable assignments can be written in any order); furthermore, in a variable assignment, next-state variable values of other variables can be referenced. If no variables are updated in a transition (i.e., G -->), the state idles.
Modules can be composed both synchronously ( ) and asynchronously ( [ ] ), and composed modules communicate via shared variables. In a synchronous composition, a transition from each module is simultaneously applied; a synchronous composition is deadlocked if either module has no enabled transition. In an asynchronous composition, an enabled transition from exactly one of the modules is nondeterministically applied.
The language is typed, and predicate sub-types can be declared. Types can be both interpreted and uninterpreted, and base types include the reals, naturals, and booleans; array types, inductive data-types, and tuple types can be defined. Both interpreted and uninterpreted constants and functions can be specified. Parameterized values are represented as uninterpreted constants from some parameterized type.
Bounded model checkers are usually used to find counterexamples, but they can also be used to prove invariants by induction over the state space [3] . SAL supports kinduction, a generalization of the induction principle, which can prove some invariants that may not be strictly inductive. Let (S, I, ->) be a transition system where S is a set of states, I C S is a set of initial states, and -> is a binary transition relation. If k is a natural number, then a k-trajectory is a sequence of states so -> s -> .. . -> sk (a 0-trajectory is a single state). Let k be a natural number, and let P be property. The k-induction principle is then defined as follows: * Base Case: Show that for each k-trajectory so Sl -> ...-> Sk such that so C I, P(sj) holds, for 0 <j < k.
* Induction
Step: Show that for all k-trajectories soSl > .. . sk, if P(sj) holds forO < j < k, then P(Sk) holds.
The principle is equivalent to the usual transition-system induction principle when k = 1. In SAL, the user specifies the depth at which to attempt an induction proof, but the attempt itself is automated. The main mode of user-guidance in the proof process we use is in iteratively building up disjunctive invariants [12] by strengthening a conjectured invariant based on the counterexamples returned by SAL in a failed proof attempt [2] . The conjectured invariant is strengthened by adding additional disjuncts, based on the returned counterexamples, representing a configuration of the system not covered by the original invariant. Disjunctive invariants contrast to the traditional approach of strengthening an invariant by adding a conjunct. The benefit of disjunctive invariants is that each disjunct need only cover a "special case" of the system, while each conjunct needs to hold in every configuration of the system's state. We describe in more detail its application to the refinement proof in Section 5. We capture this requirement with the tcl ock module in Figure 3 . The receiver's clock in Figure 4 is similarly modeled, although it is allowed to transition only when the states of the transmitter and receiver are unequal or the transmitter
has not yet sent a start bit. The two clocks serve to constrain The transmitter's environment tenv ( Figure 5) The transmitter's encoder tenc ( Figure 6 ) has one input variable, tbit, which is the output of tenv. The encoder has three output variables: tdata is the data transmitted to the receiver, tstate is the transmitter's state, and tready is the encoder's signal to tenv whenever a new bit is required from the environment. The environment (tenv) decides when a new frame of data is to be transmitted; this decision is implemented by providing an initial start bit (FALSE). The encoder module has two guarded transitions. The first guarded transition defines the behavior in the idle state (9) , which is exited when the environment produces a start bit. The second transition simply advances the transmitter's state; the ready signal is suppressed in state 8 to indicate to the environment that a stop bit (TRUE) will be inserted in the data stream.
The receiver's decoder rdec ( Figure 7 ) has a design similar to tenc. Of its three variables, tdata is the data sent by the transmitter (i.e., the output variable of tenc), rstate is the receiver's state, and rbit records the value received from the transmitter. The module has three transitions: the first allows the receiver to idle waiting for the start bit, the second transitions to the "start state", and the last transition governs states in which it is sampling for data. The data is ready to be consumed when the receiver is in one of states [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] acteristic of physical reality where changes to signals take time to propagate and to be correctly sampled. In the design of the implementation, we introduce a constraint process that limits this stuttering based upon real-time properties of the local clocks and which guarantees that the stuttering is finite.
Correctness
Informally, the protocol is correct if the output of the decoder is the same as the input of the encoder whenever the transmitter and receiver are in the same state (i.e., the receiver has just received the message sent), and the receiver is neither in state 0 or 9 -recall that in state 9, the start bit is being sent, and the model captures the possibility that the receiver misses the bit sent by the transmitter due to their clocks being unsynchronized. The Finally, SAL's deadlock checker ensures liveness of the model; given the assumption that the receiver detects a start bit, the system will eventually return to an "idle" state.
Liveness: THEOREM system G(F(rstate /= 9) => F(tstate = 9 AND rstate = 9));
8N1 Implementation
An implementation of the 8Nl protocol utilizes local clocks at the transmitter and receiver to achieve the synchronization necessary to reliably transmit data. These clocks are only loosely synchronized-each has a nominal frequency, but there may be both constant and dynamic frequency errors. Furthermore, the electrical properties of data transmission lead to both transmission delay and sampling issues due to "reading" a changing signal. The model presented in this section captures these various properties.
The overall structure of the implementation is similar to the model presented in Section 3; the essential difference is that a constraint module is introduced to capture the realtime manifestations of asynchrony between the clocks (Section 4.2). [6] . In the 8N1 protocol, the receiver and transmitter have the timeouts r c lk and t c lk that mark the real-time at which they will respectively make transitions. Each respective module representing the receiver and transmitter is allowed to execute only if its timeout equals the value of time (rclk, tclk), which is defined to be the minimum of the timeout variables: TIME : TYPE = REAL; time(tl : TIME, t2: TIME): TIME = IF tl <= t2 THEN tl ELSE t2 ENDIF; Figure 8 . Transmitter Clock (Infinite-State)
The transmitter clock t clock r t (Figure 8) The receiver clock r c lock_r t (Figure 9 ) is more complicated than the transmitter clock because of the manner in which a UART is implemented. Consider Figure 1 . There may be an arbitrary "idle" period between frames during which the signal is high (TRUE). The behavior of a UART receiver is to "scan" for the high-to-low transition The various receiver clock periods are expressed in terms of linear constraints that define lower and upper bounds for "SCAN", "START", and "PERIOD" (Figure 10 ). The constraints give the lower and upper bounds for the receiver's timeout variable to be updated. Determining the necessary constraints is achieved by assuming the worst-case error (minimum or maximum) and then determining how temporal errors accumulate by the 10th bit time (the stop bit). Informally, the correct behavior of the protocol requires that all signal samples other than the initial scan fall during the "stable" portion of the transmitter clock [2] . 
Modeling Metastability
A fundamental issue for the implementation is that it is not possible to reliably sample an asynchronous signal unless that signal is guaranteed to be stable for a period around the sampling point. Where the physical implementation is realized with a flipflop, changes occurring too soon before the sampling point are said to violate the "setup time" requirement of the flip-flop while changes occurring too soon after the settling point are said to violate the "hold time" requirement. Either violation may cause the flip-flop to enter a metastable state in which the input is neither "one" nor "zero" and which may persist indefinitely. A constraint model captures the effects of metastability. Again, without loss of generality, we consider only setup time violations. We can incorporate the hold-time requirement into the setup-time requirement simply by changing our perspective of where the sampling event occurs relative to the clocks. To model the possibility of metastability (and hence random sampling of signals), we use a decoder rdec_rt ( Figure 11 ) in which all input sampling results in the selection of a random value. To constrain the nondeterminism of the decoder, we introduce a constraint module ( Figure 12 ) that monitors changes on the input signal t dat a (when t c 1 k ' / = t c 1 k) and forces the decoder to choose the correct value whenever the setup time requirements are met.
The constraint module requires that r de c_r t select the "correct" value (i.e. t data) whenever the input signal has met the stability requirements. These stability requirements depend upon when tdata last changed its value. The timing constraints defined in Figure 10 force the settling time to be less that TPERIOD.
Proving Refinement
With both a finite-state specification and an infinite-state implementation in hand, we can now prove the latter refines the former. More specifically, every possible interleaving of the transmitter and receiver in the implementation is a possible interleaving of the specification. Paraphrasing Abadi and Lamport, I implements S if every externally visible behavior of I is also allowed by S [1] . To prove that I implements S it is sufficient to prove that if I allows the behavior o(eO, ZO), ( (GO -> SO 1 G1 > S1) (Go A G1 > SO;S1) (Recall from Section 2.3 that; is commutative.) Weakening either GO or G1 has the effect of weakening GO A G1.
Indeed, by weakening either guard to True, its associated module can be eliminated (effectively abstracting away the module's outputs). The key observation is that an unconstrained input is treated by SAL as having any possible value -eliminating a module and its associated outputs increases the nondeterminism of the corresponding inputs. Thus, in a synchronous composition P Q, guard weakening can be generalized to module elimination: P and Q are both specifications of P Q. A corollary to the equivalence above allows us to "split" a process:
(GO -> SO) ((Go -> skip) 11 (TRUE -> SO)) 
Temporal Refinement for the 8N1 Protocol
In this section, we describe the refinement conditions proved in SAL for the 8N1 protocol.
In short, the refinement is principally over the clock modules of the finite-state and infinite-state models. Recall that system_rt is the composed module (rx_rt [] tx_rt) 1I constraint.
From the discussion of module elimination above, the constraint module can be eliminated, and the composition rx_rt [] tx_rt is a specification of system_rt. For the transmitter implementation module tx_rt, we prove the single guard in tclock_rt (Figure 8) implies that the single guard in t clock ( Figure 3 ) holds:
The proof is automated in SAL using infinite-bmc induction. The proof requires a small invariant bounding the maximum skew between the clocks as a function of the transmitter's and receiver's respective states. This is the only refinement condition required for tx_rt: the other two modules, tenv and tenc, are identical in the specification and implementation. As for the module rx_rt, recall that the module is the parallel composition rdec_rt I rclock_rt. The refinement condition and proof for rclock_rt ( Figure 9 ) is exactly analogous to that for tclock_rt.
This leaves only rdec_rt to refine. To complete the refinement proof, we prove a refinement condition that slightly generalizes guard weakening. The module rdec_rt ( Figure 11 ) is actually less deterministic than is rdec (Figure 7 ), but its nondeterminism is limited by the constraint module. In simple guard weakening, the next-state variable assignments in the specification and implementation are identical, but for the modules rdec and rdec_rt, they are not. In this case, the hypothesis of the refinement condition is a conjunction of the implementation's guard and the next-state variable values produced by the implementation's transition. Likewise, the antecedent of the refinement condition is a conjunction of the specifications guard and the next-state variable values produced by the specification's corresponding transition.
Applying this reasoning to rdec_rt and rdec, we prove three theorems, one for each of the three corresponding guarded transitions in the two modules: Each of these theorems is proved using a disjunctive invariant lemma [12, 2] . For the 8N1 protocol, the disjunctive invariant covers the two special-case configurations -when the transmitter and receiver are idle and when the transmitter has sent a start bit that is not detected -as well as the two general-case configurations -when tstate = rstate andwhentstate = rstate + 1.
Discussion
We have presented by example how to use a model checker and SMT solver to prove temporal refinement of the 8N1 protocol. We have also applied this method to prove refinement of the Biphase Mark protocol, and those specifications and proofs are also available.' These results should be extensible to other physical-layer protocols. The purpose of this paper is not to delineate the class of real-time specifications to which this approach is feasible but rather to demonstrate that it is possible. The theoretical considerations of Abadi-Lamport style refinement for real-time systems (particularly with linear constraints) deserve additional study.
As mentioned in Section 1, one motivation for these refinement results comes from the desire for compositional reasoning. We have completed a infinite-state model of the 8N1 protocol composed with shift registers (with widths of eight bits) for the sender and receiver, respectively.' One would like to prove that after a round of execution of the 8N1 protocol, the receiver's shift register contains the value that was in the sender's shift register before the round. Doing the proof directly in an infinite-state model requires augmenting an invariant with properties of the shift registers. However, the proof is automatic using BDDs in a finite-state model of the system augmented with shift registers. Then, only the cross-clock domain protocol needs to be refined to a real-time implementation -the shift registers specification is the same in both the specification and implementation.
As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, although we present an methodology for temporal refinement, the realtime implementation can itself be refined using data refinement techniques. The data-refined implementation should still inherent the safety properties from the untimed, dataabstract specifications. Carrying out data refinement on our model is future work.
While this paper demonstrates the feasibility of automating parts of refinement proofs utilizing SAL, the work was somewhat hampered by the lack of a well-developed algebraic theory for the SAL language and by the need to apply algebraic reasoning by hand. Automated model checking techniques have matured sufficiently to prove the tedious refinement conditions presented in this paper, but combining SAL with a system capable of algebraic reasoning (e.g., an interactive theorem prover) would both increase the assurance and decrease the tedium of deriving the implementation and refinement conditions from the specification.
Another anonymous noted that refinement does not preserve liveness properties. We have proved liveness for the finite state model but not for the implementation. There is a possibility that the implementation is vacuous. Because the implementation is infinite-state, we cannot directly prove LTL liveness properties about it. As an approximation, we can attempt to prove some safety property of the implementation that should be false (e.g., G (t s t ate > 0 ) . If the system is deadlocked, then the property may be proved. If the property is not proved, then either the system is not deadlocked, or the property is not k-inductive, for the value of k and lemmas used in the proof effort. We call the these safety properties "poor man's liveness properties".
Finally, as this work is primarily a case-study, we provide some "lessons learned" to inform similar future endeavors. In Section 2, we gave some metrics comparing our verification efforts to previous work. In our work, the vast majority of our time was spent generalizing the model. Developing the "right" modeling abstractions took a few weeks of effort. Instantiating the general model with another physical-layer protocol would probably take a day of effort (the effort required is speculative since we developed the general model by abstracting the specific protocols). Although we conjecture that carrying out the proof via SMT and model checking is at least an order-of-magnitude faster than using mechanical theorem proving, it is still the most onerous aspect of the verification. The particular difficulty results from building up the main disjunctive invariant for a sufficiently small value of k. Developing the invariant for a new protocol may take on the order of a few days of effort.
